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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT F. BENNION,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

Case No.
920628-CA

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
COUNTY COMMISSION, UTAH COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, JEFFREY R.
MENDENHALL, COUNTY ZONING
ADMINISTRATION, SUNDANCE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
SUNDANCE VILLAGE COTTAGES, LTD., a
UTAH CORPORATION, CHARLES ROBERT
REDFORD, C. CRAIG LILJENQUIST, KAY
BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, GUY R.
BURNINGHAM, Deputy Utah County
Attorney and Civil Division Chief,
JERIL B. WILSON, Deputy Utah County
Attorney, E. KENT SUNDBERG, Deputy
Utah County Attorney,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I. JURISDICTION
This is an appeal

from a dismissal by the Fourth District

Court, Utah County, State of Utah of Appellant's action. The Court
of Appeals

has

jurisdiction

pursuant

to

Utah

Coded

Annotated

Section 78-2-2(3)(j).
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
a.

Whether appellant exhausted his administrative remedies

prior to bringing this action.

1

Standard of Review
Questions of whether a party has failed to comply
with the requirements of a statute and the rules of civil
procedure sufficient to justify dismissal are questions
of law, and on appeal, we accord no particular deference
to the determinations of law made by the trial court but
review them for correctness. Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d
20,22 (Utah 1990).
In Arrow Indus, vs. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah
1988), the court held that:
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting
a motion to dismiss, we are obliged to construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Arrow Indus., 1 SI P.2d at 936.
b.

Whether

appellant

must

comply

with

the

Governmental

Immunity Act when bringing an action for vacation and appeal of a
Board of Adjustment ruling.
Questions of whether a party has failed to comply
with the requirements of a statute and the rules of civil
procedure sufficient to justify dismissal are questions
of law, and on appeal, we accord no particular deference
to the determinations of law made by the trial court but
review them for correctness. Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d
20,22 (Utah 1990).
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
a.

U.C.A. Section 17-5-2:
Each member of the board of county commissioners
shall be an elector of the county which he
represents and must have been such for at least one
year immediately preceding his election, and he
shall be elected by the qualified electors of the
county at large.
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b.

U.C.A. Section 17-27-23 (1991):
Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any
adopted county zoning, subdivision, or official map
ordinance is punishable as a class C misdemeanor.
The Board of County Commissioners, the County
Attorney or any owner of real estate within the
county in which such violation occurs, may, in
addition to other remedies provided by law,
institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or any
other appropriate action or proceedings to prevent,
enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, use
or act. (Underline added)

c.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-1 et seq. (See Addendum 1)

d.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-2(1)

(Governmental

Immunity

Act)

(See Addendum 1)
e.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-5 (See Addendum 1)

f.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-6 (See Addendum 1)

g.

U.C.A. Sections 63-30-8, thru 10 (See Addendum 1)

h,

U.C.A. Section 63-30-11 (See Addendum 1)

i.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-12 (See Addendum 1)

j.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-13 (See Addendum 1)

k.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-14 (See Addendum 1)

1.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-15 (See Addendum 1)

m.

U.C.A. Section 63-30-19 (See Addendum 1)

n.

U.C.A. Section 78-33-1 et seq. (Declaratory Judgment Act)

(See Addendum 2)
o.

U.C.A. Section 78-33-2:
Any person interested under a deed, will or written
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are effected by a statute, municipal
ordinance,
contract
or
franchise,
may
have
determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
3

p.

U.C.Z.O. Section 2-2 B 1:
B.

LIST OF DEFINITIONS

1.

Administrative Agency

The Utah County Planning Department,
appointed Planning Commission.
q.

excluding

the

U.C.Z.O. Section 2-2 B 2:
B.

LIST OF DEFINITIONS

2.

Administrative Officer

The Planning Director, the Zoning Administrator, or any
of their duly appoint designees.
r.

U.C.Z.O. Section 7-15:
APPEALS TO THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
Any person, organization, corporation, or unit or
department of government which has been aggrieved
by a decision allegedly made in error by an
administrative officer or agency; or requesting an
interpretation of the zoning map; or wishing to
make an appeal for a special exception or variance;
may do so by filing a formal request in writing
with the Zoning Administrator. The application
shall be accepted by the Zoning Administrator only
if accompanied by a non-refundable fee of the
current amount as set by the Legislative Body, and
if the application form has been properly filed
within forty-five (45) days after the contested
action of the administrative officer or agency. The
application requesting to appear before the Board
of Adjustment shall be made on forms furnished by
the Zoning Administrator at least fifteen (15) days
prior to the date of the hearing of the appeal.
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s.

U.C.Z.O. Section 7-24:
Any person or persons, jointly or severely,
aggrieved by any action of the Board of Adjustment,
or any tax payer, or any office, department, board,
or agency of the county, may have and maintain a
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
record to having competent jurisdiction, provided
that petition for such relief is presented to the
court within thirty (30) days after the filing of
such decision in the office of the Board of
Adjustment. Unless such petition for relief is
presented to the court within said thirty (30)
days, a decision of the Board of Adjustment shall
be final . No decision of the Board of Adjustment
shall be subject to rehearing, except when remanded
from a county (SIC) of competent jurisdiction.

t.

U.C.Z.O. Section 7-29:
Any person, firm, corporation, or other entity
violating any one of the provisions of this
ordinance
shall
be guilty
of
a
Class
"C,f
misdemeanor for each such offense. The Board of
County Commissioners, the County Attorney, or any
owner of real estate within the county in which
such a violation occurs, may, in addition to other
remedies provided by law, institute injunction,
mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate
action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or
remove the unlawful building, use, or act.

u.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 14: (See
Addendum 3 ) .
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Appellant is a tax payer and owner of real property
in Utah County. He has objected on numerous occasions to special
treatment

which

has

been

accorded

to

Sundance

Development

Corporation by the administrative agencies and legislative body of
Utah County.
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Plaintiff-Appellant has brought no monetary claim which would
fall within the purview of the Governmental Immunity Act, nor has
he brought a claim for damages against the municipal bodies of Utah
County. He brought

this action timely to the District Court to

appeal

of

of

a Board

Adjustment

decision

and has

no

further

administrative remedy available to him. He brought an action to
have a

Plat

Commissioners

which
and

had
the

been

approved

Planning

by

the

Commission

Board

vacated

of
as

County
well

as

building permits issues thereunder.
This trial court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff had
failed

to

exhaust

his

administrative

remedy

and

that

he

was

required to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act in bringing
an action for vacation.
FACTS
1.

Appellant is the owner of real property located in Utah

County, State of Utah. (R at 87)
2.

On December 5, 1991, the Board of Adjustment for Utah

County ruled that:
a.

It had no authority to review the actions of the

Zoning Administrator regarding zoning decisions;
b.

Appeals

from

the

Planning

Commission

should

go

directly to the court, not to the coequal Board of Adjustment with
which it has partially common membership; and
c.

Permit

8663

be corrected

changed to the proper entity. (R at 34)
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to

have

the

ownership

3.

Fursuant to statute, appeal to the district court was

brought within thirty (30) days and Complaint herein was filed on
or about January 2, 1992. (R at 2)
4.

Appellant sought the following relief with the district

court:

appeals

a.

Abatement of building Permit 8780;

b.

Declaration of rights of appellant with regard to

to

the Board

of

Adjustment

of

actions

of

the

Zoning

Administrator;
c.

Declaration of rights with regard to Permit 8663 and

the original and sole jurisdiction of the Utah County Board of
Adjustment to grant and hear variances;
d.

Abatement of Plat "A" Amended [5] of the Sundance

Recreational Resort; and
e.

Compliance

with

the

zoning

ordinance

by

county

officials and agencies. (R at 7-8)
5.

Parties

included

county

agencies,

county

officials,

private individuals and a public corporation. (R at 13)
6.

Sundance Recreational Resort Plat "A" Amended [5], (the

Plat), was approved by the Board of County Commissioners of Utah
County. (R at 8)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I
This

action

was

dismissed

for

failure

to

exhaust

administrative remedies and failure to comply with the Utah
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Governmental

Immunity

Act.

Appellant

requirements in making an appeal
then bringing an appeal

followed

the

procedural

to the Board of Adjustment and

to the district court

when his

appeal

before the Board of Adjustment was denied. The Board of Adjustment
denied Appeal 1052, that it had no holding jurisdiction to review
his claim. Because the Board of Adjustment denies jurisdiction to
review

Building

Permits,

abatement

of Permit

8780

was

sought

directly. As part of this appeal, plaintiff seeks declaration of
rights and determination with regard to those actions which the
Board of Adjustment has stated it has no jurisdiction to hear.
In addition the above, Appellant

has brought an action to

abate a Plat for which no administrative appeal process existed at
the time this action was brought. Statutory and other requirements
for exhaustion of administrative remedies having been met, there
were no grounds for dismissal. It must therefore

be set aside.

II
Appellant brought

this action under authority of Utah Code

Annotated Section 78-33-2 for declaration of individual rights as
to which actions may be brought before the Board of Adjustment, as
well as Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-23 for abatement of a
plat and building

permit. Appeal

from denials by

the Board of

Adjustment must be filed within thirty (30) days of such denial. No
other requirements were mandated by the statute with regard to
undertakings, notice or any other procedures. There neither is nor
was a statutory requirement that provisions of the Governmental
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Immunity Act be observed when taking an appeal from a decision by
the Board of Adjustment.
The Governmental

Immunity Act serves the dual purposes of

waiving stated and municipal immunity from monetary claims due to
negligence and standardizing procedures for bringing claims for
money or damages under negligence, property or contract actions.
Because the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to plaintiff,
dismissal was improper.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Sundance Development Corporation is the primary owner of a
recreational resort located in Northfork Canyon of the Provo River
behind Mount Timpanogos. (R at 11) As such, it is subject to the
Utah County Zoning Ordinance and specifically to the provisions of
the recreational

resorts, chapter 6-5.

In the summer

of 1991,

Sundance Development Corporation began construction on sewer lines
and moving stream beds without a permit or permission from the
Board

of

located

County
on

the

Commissioners.
Plat

or

Neither

approved

by

were
the

all

improvements

Board

of

County

Commissioners. (R at 8)
Appellant

brought

Development Corporation

the

failure

of

Defendant

Sundance

to obtain proper permits and

approvals

prior to beginning construction to the attention of the Utah County
Planning Department, the Planning Commission and the Utah County
Board of County Commissioners. No action was taken with regard to
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Sundance Development

Corporation's

failure

to

comply

with

the

zoning ordinance other than to issue building permits to cover
ongoing and complete work. Sundance Development Corporation then
proceeded to seek approval of a new plat, Sundance Recreational
Resort Plat "A" Amended

[5] (the Plat).

It was approved by the

Board of County Commissioners and Planning Commission on or about
October 16, 1991.

Building Permit 8663 was issued to legitimize

several improvements complained of by Appellant. No variance was
issued regarding Permit 8663 although the improvements materially
violated the Utah County Zoning

Ordinance.

(R at

4) Following

issuance of Permit 8663, appellant timely appealed this act to the
Board of Adjustment of Utah County to have the building permit
issued by the Planning Department vacated for failure to apply for
variance prior to application for the building permit. (R at 34) On
December 5, 1991, the Board of Adjustment entered the following
denial of appeal.
That the Board of Adjustment deny the appeal application
that an error was made by the Zoning Administrative,
based on the following findings: (1) the Zoning
Administrative acted under the direction of the Planning
Commission and therefore cannot be acted upon by the
Board. (2) Appeals from decisions of the Planning
Commission should go directly to the court, not to the
co-equal Board of Adjustment which has partially common
membership. (3) Permit 8663 to be corrected to have the
ownership changed to have the proper entity. (R at 34)
Aside from the sel f-contradictory
Adjustment
because

it

which state
calls

into

that

they

question

actions of the Board of

cannot
the

act upon Appeal

actions

of

the

8663

Zoning

Administrator and at the same times directs that Permit 8663 have
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the ownership information corrected by the thereon, presumably same
Zoning Administrator, the effect of the actions of the Board of
Adjustment was to deny its statutory-jurisdiction to grant or deny
variances for building permits.
Appellant then timely filed this action to appeal the denial
of Appeal 1052 by the Board of Adjustment. (R at 2) Because the
refusal to exercise jurisdiction by the Board of Adjustment was
decided

under

a

"statute

brought

a declaratory

[or] municipal

rights

Section 78-33-2. Appellant

ordinance",

appellant

action under Utah Code Annotated

also brought, pursuant

to Utah

Code

Annotated Section 17-27-23, an action to abate the Plat to the
extent that it violates the Utah County Zoning Ordinance and to
abate building Permits 8780 and 8663 which are both based upon the
Plat. (R at 8-13) On May 13, 1992, the trial

court entered the

following rule dismissing appellant's action:
The court hereby grants defendants' motion. Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
instigating this legal action. He must first appeal his
grievance to the Utah County Board of Adjustments. In
addition, even if plaintiff did not need to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking legal redress, he
has failed to comply with the requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated Section
63-30-1 et seq. (R at 96)
After appellant's Motion for New Trial was denied, appellant
timely brought this appeal. (R at 137) In Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d
20,22 (Utah 1990) the court held that "
Questions of whether a party has failed to comply
with the requirements of a statute and the rules of civil
procedure sufficient to justify dismissal are question of
law, and on appeal, we accord no particular deference to
the determinations of law made by the trial court but
review them for correctness. Avila, 794 P.2d at 22.
11

In as much as this appeal

is based upon a dismissal

for

failure to comply with rules of procedure and statutes, the court
is presented with a question of law. The trial court's decision
must therefore be granted no particular deference.
In determining which facts to rely upon in an appeal

from

dismissal, in Arrow Indus, vs. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P.2d 935
(Utah 1988), the court held that:
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting
a motion to dismiss, we are obliged to construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Arrow Indus., 767 P.2d at 936.
The facts must therefore be viewed in the light most favorable
to Appellant.
POINT II
A. Administrative Remedies With Regard To Appeal No. 1052
Were Exhausted.
The primary basis for dismissal of this action was failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. (R at 96) . This Ruling, however,
is contrary

to the facts and is without

any basis. Appellant

brought Appeal No. 1052 before the Board of Adjustment of Utah
County pursuant to the Utah County Zoning Ordinance and within the
time limits therein regarding Building Permit 8663. On December 5,
1991, the Board of Adjustment denied Appeal No. 1052. (R at 34)
Utah County Zoning Ordinance Section 7-24 RECOURSE FROM ACTIONS
TAKEN BY THE BOARD, provides as follows:
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Any person or persons, jointly or severely, aggrieved by
any action of the Board of Adjustment, or any tax payer,
or any office, department, board, or agency of the
county, may have and maintain a plenary action for relief
therefrom in any court of record to having competent
jurisdiction, provided that petition for such relief is
presented to the court within thirty (30) days after the
filing of such decision in the office of the Board of
Adjustment. Unless such petition for relief is presented
to the court within said thirty (30) days, a decision of
the Board of Adjustment shall be final. No decision of
the Board of Adjustment shall be subject to rehearing,
except when remanded from a county (SIC) of competent
jurisdiction.
An appeal to the District Court is the only remedy available
after denial of appeal by the Board of Adjustment. Appellant then
filed this action January 2, 1992, which was within thirty

(30)

days of the denial of Appeal 1052. (R at 2) Appellant has therefore
complied with all requirements of the statute and zoning ordinance
and has exhausted his administrative remedies in seeking to have an
action of the Zoning Administrator and the issuance of a building
permit set aside. Dismissal was therefore improper regarding Appeal
1052.
B. Administrative Remedies Were Exhausted With Regard To The Plat
As part of this action, appellant sought to have Sundance
Recreational Resort Plat "A" Amended [5] abated. (R at 8) The Plat
was approved by the Utah County Commission. Utah County Zoning
Ordinance Section 7-15 provides as follows:
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APPEALS TO THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
Any person, organization, corporation, or unit or
department of government which has been aggrieved by a
decision allegedly made in error by an administrative
officer or agency; or requesting an interpretation of the
zoning map; or wishing to make an appeal for a special
exception or variance; may do so by filing a formal
request in writing with the Zoning Administrator. The
application shall be accepted by the Zoning Administrator
only if accompanied by a non-refundable fee of the
current amount as set by the Legislative Body, and if the
application form has been properly filed within fortyfive (45) days after the contested action of the
administrative officer or agency. The
application
requesting to appear before the Board of Adjustment shall
be made on forms furnished by the Zoning Administrator at
least fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the hearing
of the appeal.
The Board of Adjustment can only hear appeals from "a decision
allegedly made in error by an administrative office of agency; or
requesting an interpretation of the zoning map; or wishing to make
an appeal for a special exception or variance." Utah County Zoning
Ordinance Section 2-2 B 1 defines administrative agency as "the
Utah County Planning Department, excluding the appointed Planning
Commission". Utah County Zoning Ordinance Section 2-2 B 2 defines
administrative

officer

as

"the

Planning

Director,

the

Zoning

Administrator or any of their duly appointed designees." The only
appeals, therefore, that can be heard by the Board of Adjustment
are from acts by the Planning Department or the Planning Director,
the Zoning Administrator or appointed designees of them. No appeal
may be had from an act by either the Planning Commission, which is
expressly not an administrative agency, or the Board of County
Commissioners, which is an elected body, and not a part of the
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Planning Department U.C.A. 17-5-2. The Plat was recommended for
approval by the Planning Commission and it was approved by the
Board of County Commissioners for Utah County. (R at 6) There was
no provision for review of plats approved by the Board of County
Commissioners

at

the

time

this

action

was

brought,

and

the

administrative remedies regarding the Plat were exhausted therefore
by appellant prior to the filing of this action on January 2, 1992.
Appellant having exhausted his administrative remedies with regard
to the Flat, dismissal was improper.
C. Appeal of Building Permit 8780 is excused for futility.
Appellant also brought Building Permit 8780 for abatement as
part of this action. Appellant does not dispute that he did not
appeal

the

issuance

of

Building

Permit

8780

to the

Board

of

Adjustment, but claims that such an act would have been useless and
therefore unnecessary.
As part

of its ruling

Adjustment stated

that

denying Appeal

1052, the Board of

it did not have jurisdiction

to

review

building permits issued by the Zoning Administrator. (R at 34) The
Board of Adjustment held that "the Zoning Administrator acted under
the direction the Planning commission and therefor (SIC) can not be
acted upon by the Board." (R at id) As Building Permit 8780 arose
under exactly the same type of circumstances, appellant could only
expect to have a denial based upon lack of jurisdiction entered by
the Board of Adjustment. The courts in Utah have long recognized
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has an
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important exception; that is, that no useless act will be required.
A party will not be required to waste time and resources if the end
result is a foregone conclusion. See In Re: Tanner, 549 P.2d 703
(Utah 1976); and State Tax Commission vs. Verson, 782 P. 2d 519
iutan i^oy;.
Because the Utah County Board of Adjustment ruled itself to be
without jurisdiction to hear Appeal 1052 regarding Building Permit
8663

(R

at

id), it

was

very

unlikely

to

find

itself

with

jurisdiction to review Building Permit 8780. It would have been a
waste of appellant* s money and time to pay the filing fee, prepare
the appeal, attend the Board of Adjustment's meeting, present his
case, and then be denied for lack of jurisdiction. Dismissal was
therefore improper with regard to Permit 8780 also.
POINT III
A. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Apply To This
Action.
The trial court dismissed this action by also relying on the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Chapter 30 of Title 63 of the Utah
Code. (R at 96) However, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the
Act) is limited in scope and

only applies to certain types of

actions. Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-2(1) defines a claim as:
"Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or
damages against a governmental entity or against an
employee.(Underline added)
Only money or damage claims are controlled by the Act. The Act
then lists numerous procedural requirements for bringing a claim.
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Utah

Code

Annotated

Section

requirements with regard

63-30-11

to information

sets

out

the

notice

to be provided

to the

government on claims. Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 establish the
time limits for bringing a claim against either the State or a
political subdivision thereof. Section 63-30-14 provides that a
notice within ninety (90) days will be given as to approval or
denial of the claim the from which runs a separate one (1) year
time period in which a "claim" may be brought under U.C.A. Section
63-30-15. Section 63-30-19 also requires an undertaking to be
provided. The key

to all

these procedural bars upon which

the

District Court dismissed this action is the word "claim". Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-30-11 is limited to:
(1) "CLAIM" arises when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person
beings to run.
(2) Any person having a "CLAIM" for injury...
U.C.A. 63-30-12 is limited to "[A] 'CLAIM1 against the
state..." U.C.A. 63-30-13 is limited to "[A] "CLAIM' against a
political subdivision..." U.C.A. 63-30-14 limits itself to
ninety days of the filing of a "CLAIM*..."

'Within

U.C.A. 63-30-15 only

discusses whether "the CLAIM" is denied. U.C.A. 63-30-19 refers to
actions brought under this chapter. From a review of the intended
breath of this chapter by the word claim, and the limitation of all
of the procedures

to claims which are "for money or damages",

application of the Act to this action was improper.
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Statutes are examined as a whole (Schurtz v. BMW of North
America,

Inc. , 814

F.2d

1108,

1112

(Utah

1991)),

the

whole

legislative scheme, as it exists, must be compared to Appellant's
action.

The body of the Act

only refers to money and

damage

actions. U.C.A. Section 63-30-5 waives immunity for contractual
obligations, and expressly waives procedural claim requirements as
identified above. U.C.A. Sections 63-30-6 and 10.5 waive immunity
regarding real and personal property ownership. U.C.A. Sections 6330-8 thru 10 waive immunity regarding injury due to negligence.
Appellant, however, has brought no action for either money or
damages against a political subdivision of the State or the State
of Utah. Appellant's prayer for relief requests only the following:
1.

Abatement of Building Permit 8780;

2.

Declaration of rights of appellant with regard to appeal

to the Board of Adjustment of actions by the Zoning Administrator;
3.

Declaration of rights with regard to Permit 8663 and the

originals and that the Utah County Board of Adjustment has original
sole jurisdiction to grant and hear variances;
4.

Abatement of the plat; and

5.

That the Utah County officials and agencies be ordered to

comply with the Zoning Ordinance. (R at 7-8)
Because none of Appellant's requests are for damages or for
money, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to this
action.

B. Appellant Has Brought This Action As A Private Attorney
General.
Utah Code

Annotated

Section

17-27-23

(1991) provides

the

following authority for bringing an action for violation of the
Zoning Ordinance:
Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any adopted
county zoning, subdivision, or official map ordinance is
punishable as a class C misdemeanor. The Board of County
Commissioners, the County Attorney or any owner of real
estate within the county in which such violation occurs,
may, in addition to other remedies provided by law,
institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other
appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin,
abate, or remove the unlawful building, use or act.
(Underline added)
Appellant

is the

owner

of real

property

located

in Utah

County, State of Utah. (R at 87) The legislature granted authority
to owners of real property to act in the same capacity as the
County Attorney and therefore to act as private attorneys general
with regard

to

enforcement

of

zoning

ordinances. There

is

no

reference herein to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. However,
there is a broad grant of power to "institute injunction, mandamus,
abatements or any other appropriate action or proceedings"... Utah
County

Zoning

Ordinance

Section

7-29

granted

owners

of

real

property the same right under the Zoning Ordinance.
Appellant, as a private attorney general, has sought to abate
Building Permit 8780, abate the Plat, and seeks mandamus whereby
the County officials and agencies are ordered to comply with the
Zoning Ordinance and enforcement thereof. (R at 7-8) Since a clear
statutory grant of equitable power has been made by the
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legislature, as well as a grant of the power of private attorney
general to protect the equitable value of an individual's property
from improper acts by any individual, to include County officials
and County agencies, the only explicit legislatively imposed limits
must be met to exercise this right. The trial court has sought to
abridge this grant of authority to the owners of real property by
engrafting the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
onto this section. (R at So)
The trial court has implicitly interpreted the statutes in
question to include the Governmental Immunity Act by reference. In
reviewing interpretation

of statutes by

the trial court, a no

deference is granted to the trial court and a "correction of error"
standard is used. See Ketchum, Konkel, et al v. Heritage Mtn, 784
P.2d 1217,1220 (Utah App. 1989).
In Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P. 2d 111 (Utah 1991), the court held
that:
The primary rule of statutory construction is to give
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose of the statute was meant to achieve. Reeves, 813
P.2d at 115.
Applying

that

rule to the Governmental

Immunity

Act, the

statute sets out orderly provisions for the processing and review
of money and damage claims. It is not ambiguous, and is limited to
this purpose.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, U.C.A. 78-33-1 et seq is for the
equitable determination of rights under statute. U.C.A. 17-27-23
grants authority to landowners the power to act as attorneys
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general

on

an

equal

footing

legislative

purpose

of

individuals

to protect

with

both
their

of

the

these

county
statutes

rights, either

by

attorney.
is
a

to

The
allow

declaratory

judgment action regarding personal obligations and rights, U.C.A.
78-33-2, or to protect equitable real property interests, U.C.A.
17-27-23. These statutes and the Governmental

Immunity Act have

only one thing in common, the state may be a defendant.
In as much as

the major purposes

of

these

statutes

are

distinct and separate, engrafting the claims control requirements
on these rights statutes is improper.
C. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Apply To Appeals.
The court did not state upon what grounds it was including the
requirement that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act be applied to
appeals from the Board of Adjustment. However, a review Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 14 provides in material part that:
[A] Petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
teh appellate court within the time prescribed by
statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within
30 days after the date of the written decision or order.
The court, by

its Rules

of Appellate Procedure, does not

require that appeals from orders and decisions of administrative
bodies be subject

to the Utah

default for appeal of thirty

Governmental

Immunity

Act.

The

(30) days indicates that no ninety

(30) day limit and notice requirement exists.
The reason for this is obvious. An administrative agency, in
this action, the Utah County Board of Adjustment, has been aware
for a significant period of time of the basis of the potential
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action, as well as having had all of the facts argued before it. (R
at 34) Giving it an additional ninety (SO) days within which to
decide whether or not there is a valid claim, after it has issued
a formal decision, would be to allow it to reverse its decisions in
an informal appellate procedure which is not provided for either by
statute or ordinance. It would not be fair to a party adversely
effected by a reversal

of the decision

in private, and would

therefore be a violation of due process rights.
Because the administrative agency is well aware of the basis
of the action, there being no money or other damages sought (R at
7-8), and that granting an agency an additional ninety (SO) days
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-14 to review and
perhaps change its decision would serve no permissible purpose, it
is simply

illogical

to engraft

the Act

onto appeals

from the

decisions of administrative agencies.
D. The Act Does Not Apply To Declaratory Judgment Actions
Appellant brought his Complaint partially in the nature of a
declaratory

judgment

action,

U.C.A.Section

78-33-1

et

seq

(Declaratory Judgment Act). (R at 7-8) Utah Code Annotated Section
78-33-2 provides as follows:
Any person interested under a deed, will or written
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are effected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise, may have determined any question
of construction or validity arising under the instrument,
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.
Appellant, as an owner of real property in Utah County, wished
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to know whether

the Board

of Adjustment will

hear his

appeals

regarding improper issuance of building permits, or whether such
action should be brought only in the District Court. (R at 7-8,13)
Appellant has been told by the Board of Adjustment that he can only
bring the action in the District Court. (R at 34) Appellant has
also been told by the District

Court that he cannot bring

the

action in the District Court. (R at 96) The District Court has
engrafted the Utah Governmental Immunity Act onto the Declaratory
Judgments Act as an additional requirement for having an equitable
decision reached regarding his available rights.
In American Tierra v. City of West Jordan, 186 Utah Advance
Report 3 (Utah 1992), the court held that:
This court long has recognized a common law exception to
governmental immunity for equitable claims. American
Tierra, 186 Utah Advance Report at 4.
Declaratory Judgment actions are equitable in nature as they
are solely to determine relationships and are not necessarily for
"money or damages". Dismissal was therefore improper in as much as
the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act does not apply to equitable

actions such as has been brought by appellant.
E. This Action Was Brought Under Separate Statutory Authority
Finally, Appellant points out the fact that each of his claims
was brought

under

an express grant

of authority

not

contained

within the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. His declaratory judgment
action was brought under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-1.

Z3

His

abatement action was brought under Utah Code Annotated Section 1727-23 (1391). Appellant's appeal from denial of Appeal 1052 by the
Utah County

Board

of Adjustment

was brought under Utah County

Zoning Ordinance Section 7-24.
In Adkins vs. Division of State Land, 719 P. 2d 524

(Utah

1986), the trial court dismissed plaintiff's action for failure to
comply

with

the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act. Plaintiff

had

brought his action under a separate statute, and had failed to meet
the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as a result.
The court held that:
We believe that court's reliance upon the Government
Immunity Act was misplaced...We find nothing in the
Immunity Act which indicates that the legislature
intended to impose the requirement of filing a claim with
the Attorney General when the claimant was pursuing a
dispute which by statute had been made cognissable by an
administrative body. This view is consistent with our
decision in Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d
321, 396 P.2d 622 (1964) where he held that governmental
immunity was not a defense for a writ of mandamus to
compel the defendant Land Board to comply with its
statutory duty to issue and oil and gas lease to the
plaintiff. In that case, we distinguished Wilkinson v.
State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P 626 (1913) where we held that
governmental immunity barred an action for damage against
the State caused by waters escaping from a canal owned
and controlled by the Board Land Commissioners.
Section 65-1-9(2) expressly authorized judicial review of
decision of the "board". We find no persuasive reason why
we should engraft upon that subsection the requirement of
filing and undertaking as required by Section 63-30-19,
which applies to the filing of actions on claims against
he State where immunity once existed but which has been
expressly waived by the Governmental Immunity Act. That
is not the situation in the instant case where we are
dealing with an appeal from an administrative agency to
the courts as authorized by statute. Adkins, 719 P. 2d at
525-526. (Italics in original)
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The trial court has sought to engraft unauthorized road blocks
and procedural

difficulties

onto specific

grants

of

statutory

authority which are available to appellant. This engraftment has
caused appellant unnecessary and undue delay and expense in the
vindication of his rights. The dismissal should therefore be set
aside as contrary to established State law,
CONCLUSION
The trial court dismissed this action for failure to exhaust
administrative

remedies

and

for

failure

to

comply

with

the

Governmental Immunity Act. The administrative remedies were
exhausted with regard to Building Permit 8663 under Appeal 1052 and
the Flat. It would be an act of futility to have appealed to the
Board of Adjustment Building Permit 8780 in as much as the Board of
Adjustment declined jurisdiction to hear the issue with regard to
Appeal 1052. As useless acts are not required prior to appeal,
appeal of Building Permit 8780 is therefore proper. Dismissal on
this ground is therefore improper.
There is no basis for the application of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act to the present action. Appellant is not seeking either
money or damages. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, by its terms,
only

applies

to

actions

for

money

or

damages.

In

addition,

appellant is seeking relief under separate statutory grant which
does not expressly include the Governmental

Immunity Act and is

contrary to establish State law under Adkins. Appellant also seeks
equitable remedies which are traditionally not required to conform
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to the Governmental Immunity Act Guidelines. Finally, appeal from
denial of Appeal 1052 before the Board of Adjustment is an appeal
from the ruling of an administrative body, and therefore not under
the jurisdiction and guidelines of the Governmental Immunity Act.
In as much as

dismissal

has no basis

in

law, it

should

therefore be set aside and^ew trial granted.
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63-30-1
Section
63-30-26.

63-30-27.

63-30-28.

63-30-29.
63-30-29.5.

63-30-30,
63-30-31.
63-30-32.
63-30-33.

63-30-34.

63-30-35.

63-30-36.

63-30-37.

63-30-38.

Reserve funds for payment of claims
or purchase of insurance created by
political subdivisions.
Tax levy by political subdivisions for
payment of claims, judgments, or insurance premiums.
Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or self-insurance by governmental entity authorized — Establishment of trust accounts for selfinsurance.
Repealed.
Liability insurance — Government
vehicles operated by employees outside scope of employment.
Repealed.
Liability insurance — Construction of
policy not in compliance with act.
Liability insurance — Methods for
purchase or renewal.
Liability insurance — Insurance for
employees authorized — No right to
indemnification
or
contribution
from governmental agency.
Limitation of judgments against governmental entity or employee — Insurance coverage exception.
Expenses of attorney general, general
counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel for the Legislature in
representing the state, its branches,
members, or employees.
Defending government employee —
Request — Cooperation — Payment
of judgment.
Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee.
Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.

63-30-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act."
1965
63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:

(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action
for money or damages against a governmental
entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental
entity's officers, employees, servants,
trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board, members
of a commission, or members of an advisory
body, officers and employees in accordance
with Section 62A-4-603, student teachers
certificated in accordance with Section
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services to members of
the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health
care clinical training program, volunteers,
and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether
or not the individual holding that position
receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state
and its political subdivisions as defined in this
chapter.,
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(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any
act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether
or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken
in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be
performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental
entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person,
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private
person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any
kind other than property damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county,
city, town, school district, public transit district,
redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or
personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority,
commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
1991

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities
from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing,
or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the
following state medical programs and services
performed at a state-owned university hospital
are unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and are considered to be
governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another
hospital or physician because of the high risk
nature of the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available
in Utah only at a state-owned university
hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned university
acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive
appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital
or by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is unique or essential to the core of governmental activity
in this state,
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds
the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the
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claimant may submit the excess claim to the
Board of Examiners and the Legislature under
Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management offloodwaters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation offloodand storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice
Center are immune from suit for any injury which
results from their joint intergovernmental functions
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4.
1991
63-30-4.

Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of
waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.

(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless
specifically provided, may be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by
or for governmental entities or their employees.
(}>) If immunity from suit is waived by this
chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the
entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is
created by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute Inability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as
adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a
governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this chapter against a governmental
entity or its employee for an injury caused by an
act or omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority is, a
plaintiffs exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any
other civil action or proceeding based upon the
same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act
through fraud or malice; or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the
conditions set forth in Subsection 63-3036(3)(c).
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against
a governmental entity in a representative capacity if
the act or omission complained of is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee
may be held personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority, unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to t.ct due to fraud or malice.
1991

63-30-5.

Waiver of immunity as to contractual
obligations.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations
shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections
63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or
63-30-19.

63-30-10

(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of
Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver
water from a reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver the contractual
amount of water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in
the amount of available water.
1991
63-30-6.

Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved.
1965
63-30-7.

Repealed.

1991

63-30-8.

Waiver of immunity for injury caused

by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other
structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10,
immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street,
alley, crosswalk,, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
1991
63-30-9.

Waiver of immunity for injury from
dangerous or defective public building, structure, or other public improvement — Exception.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10,
immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or
defective condition of any public building, structure,
dam, reservoir, or other public improvement.
1991
63-30-10.

Waiver of immunity for injury caused
by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:

(1) the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of men-,
tal anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee
whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
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(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies,
public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil
disturbances;
(8) or in connection with t h e collection of and
assessment of taxes;
(9) t h e activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of a n y person in any
state prison, county or city jail, or other place of
legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned
or controlled lands, any condition existing in connection with a n abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the Board of
State Lands and Forestry;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) t h e management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of
flood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of a n emergency vehicle,
while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct,
or other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
1991

63-30-10.5. Waiver o f immunity for taking private property without compensation.
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for t h e recovery of compensation
from the governmental entity when the governmental entit; has taken or damaged private property for
public uses without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed
according to the requL ernents of Title 78, Chapter 34,
Eminent Domain.
1991
63-30-10.6. A t t o r n e y s ' fees for records requests.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under
Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys* fees under
Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously
with a petition for review under Section
63-2-404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not
apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attorneys* fees under Subsection
(1) may be brought contemporaneously with the
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action.
1992

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents
— Service — Legal disability.
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(1) A claim arises when t h e statute of limitations
that would apply if the claim were against a private
person begins to r u n .
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against a n employee for an
act or omission occurring during t h e performance of
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining a n action, regardless of whether or not t h e function giving rise to the
claim is characterized a s governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of t h e claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant
so far as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by t h e person making the claim
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or
legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to t h e requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority,
or mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian a t the time t h e claim arises, t h e claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for
service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend the time
for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant a n extension
that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an
extension, the court shall consider whether the
delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
1991
63-30-12.

Claim against state or its employee —
Time for filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee
for an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment,
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of
time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
1987
63-30-13.

Claim against political subdivision or
its employee — Time for tiling notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against
its employee for av\ act or omission occurring during
the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body of
the political subdivision within one year after the
claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
1987

63-30-14.

Claim for injury —- Approval or denial
by governmental entity or insurance
carrier within ninety d a y s .
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act
thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have
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been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
1965
63-30-15.

Denial of claim for injury — Authority
and time for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute
an action in the district court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action withim one
year after denial of the claim or within one year after
the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1987
63-30-16.

Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Application of Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter,
and such actions shall be governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent
with this chapter.
1983
63-30-17. Venue of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the
county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake
County. Actions against a county may be brought in
the county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court
judge of the defendant county, in any county contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions
including cities and towns, shall be brought in the
county in which the political subdivision is located or
in the county in which the claim arose.
1983
63-30-18.

Compromise and settlement of ac-

tions.
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its
legal officer or o ' «er legal counsel if it does not have a
legal officer, nr compromise and settle any action
as to the dama/^s or other relief sought.
(2) The risk nu.nager in the Department of Administrative Services may:
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000
or less in damages filed against the state for
which the Risk Management Fund may be liable;
and
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle any claim of more
than $25,000 in damages for which the Risk
Management Fund may be liable.
1990
63-30-19.

Undertaking required of plaintiff in
action.
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in
no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned upon
payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by
the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff
fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment.
1965

the same subject matter, against the employee whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim.
1965
63-30-21.

J u d g m e n t against governmental entity bars action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of

Repealed.

1978

63-30-22.

Exemplary or punitive d a m a g e s prohibited — Governmental entity exempt
from execution, attachment, or garnishment.
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive
damages.
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any judgment entered against a state employee in the employee's personal capacity even if
the judgment is for or includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state would be required to
pay the judgment under Section 63-30-36 or
63-30-37.
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may
not issue against a governmental entity.
1991
63-30-23.

Payment of claim or judgment against
state — Presentment for payment.
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained
against the state shall be presented to the state risk
manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other
instrumentality involved for payment, if payment by
said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If
such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed as provided in
Section 63-6 -10.
1987
63-30-24.

Payment of claim or judgment against
political subdivision — Procedure by
governing body.
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or
any final judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of
said political subdivision unless said funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law or contract for other purposes.
1965
63-30-25.

Payment of claim or judgment against
political subdivision — Installment
payments.
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or
award during the current fiscal year it may pay the
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual
installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
1965
63-30-26.

Reserve funds for payment of claims
or purchase of insurance created by
political subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain
a reserve fund or may jointly with one or more other
political subdivisions make contributions to a joint
reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of
claims against the co-operating subdivisions when
they become payable pursuant to this chapter, or for
the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all
risks created by this chapter.
1983
63-30-27.

63-30-20.

63-30-27

Tax levy by political subdivisions for
payment of claims, judgments, or insurance premiums.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, all political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay the following:
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(a) any claim;
(b) any settlement;
(c) any judgment, including any judgment
against an elected official or employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers, based
upon a claim for punitive damages but the authority of a political subdivision for the payment
of any judgment for punitive damages is limited
in any individual case to $10,000;
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated.
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for punitive damage judgments or to pay the
premium for such insurance as authorized is money
spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this
section and Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution,
even though as a result of the levy the maximum levy
as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No levy
under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property. The revenues derived
from this levy may not be used for any other purpose
than those stipulated in this section.
1088
63-30-28. Liability insurance — P u r c h a s e of insurance or self-insurance b y governmental entity authorized — Establishm e n t of trust accounts for self-insurance.
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may
purch?<se commercial insurance, self-insure, or selfinsure and purchase excess commercial insurance in
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against
any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any
action for ..hirli a governmental entity or its employee may 1><3 held liable.
(2) (a) In add lion to any other reasonable means
of self-insurance, a governmental entity may
self-insure with respect to specified classes of
claims by establishing a trust account under the
management of an independent private trustee
having authority with respect to claims of that
character to expend both principal and earnings
of the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation, discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees, and to
pay all sums for which the governmental entity
may be adjudged liable or for which a compromise settlement may be agreed upon.
(b) The monies and interest earned on said
trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant to Title 51, Chapter 7, State Money Management Act of 1974, and shall be subject to audit by
the state auditor.
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the
trust agreement between the governmental entity
and the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ
counsel to defend actions against the entity and its
employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of
the trust, to provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert witnesses and
consultants, and to provide such other services and
functions necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the trust.
1991
63-30-29. Repealed.

1983

63-30-29.5. Liability insurance —- Government
vehicles operated by employees outside scope of employment.
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A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven
by employees of the governmental entity with the
express or implied consent of the entity, but which, at
the time liability is incurred as a result of an automobile accident, is not being driven and used within the
course and scope of the driver's employment is considered to provide the driver with the insurance coverage required by Title 41, Chapter 12a. However, the
liability coverages considered provided are the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304.
1985
63-30-30. Repealed.

1978

63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of
policy n o t in compliance with act.
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and purchased to insure against any risk
which may arise as a result of the application of this
chapter, which contains any condition or provision
not in compliance with the requirements of the chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but shall
be construed and applied in accordance with such
conditions and provisions as would have applied had
such policy, rider or endorsement been in full compliance with this chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid.
1983
63-30-32. Liability i n s u r a n c e — M e t h o d s for
purchase or renewal.
No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased or renewed under this chapter except upon
public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder;
except that the purchase or renewal of insurance by
the state shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 63-56-1 through 63-56-73. 1983
63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for
employees authorized — No right to indemnification or contribution from
governmental agency.
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or
all of its employees against liability, in whole or
in part, for injury or damage resulting from an
act or omission occurring during the performance
of an employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, regardless
of whether or not that entity is immune from suit
for that act or omission.
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a
public purpose.
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance
providing coverage on behalf of a governmental
entity or employee for any liability defined by
this section, regardless of the source of funding
for the coverage, the insurer has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee for any loss or liability covered by the contract or policy.
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or
its employee under any faithful performance surety
bond has no right to indemnification or contribution
from the governmental entity or its employee for any
loss covered by that bond based on any act or omission for which the governmental entity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under the provisions of
Section 63-30-36.
1991
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against governmental entity or employee — Insurance coverage exception.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a
judgment for damages for personal injury against
a governmental entity, or an employee whom a
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governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any
one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount.
(b) A court may not award judgment of more
than $250,000 for injury or death to one person
regardless of whether or not the function giving
rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a
judgment for property damage against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds
$100,000 in any one occurrence, the court shall
reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless
of whether or not the function giving rise to the
damage is characterized as governmental.
(2) The damage limits established in this section
do not apply to damages awarded as compensation
when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property for public use without just compensation.
1091
63-30-35.

E x p e n s e s of attorney general, general

counsel for state judiciary, and general
counsel for the Legislature in representing the state, its branches, members, or employees.
(1) (a) After consultation with appropriate state
agencies, the state lisk manager shall provide a
comprehensive liability plan, with limits not
lower than those set forth in Section 63-30-34,
that will protect the state and its indemnified
employees from claims and liability.
(b) The risk manager shall establish deductibles and maximum limits of coverage in consultation with the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services.
(2) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to provide legal representation to the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches of state government in cases where
Risk Management Fund coverage applies.
(b) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide legal representation to the
judicial or legislative branches, the attorney general shall consult with the general counsel for
the state judiciary and with the general counsel
for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in
defending th( i respective branch, and in determining strategy and making decisions concerning the disposition of those claims. The decision
for settlement of monetary claims in those cases,
however, lies with the attorney general and the
state risk manager.
(3) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation
with the general counsel for the state judiciary,
determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees because of a
conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the
Judicial Council may direct its general counsel to
separately represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes independent legal representation of the state judiciary, its members, or employees, the general counsel shall notify the state
risk manager and the attorney general in writing
before undertaking that representation.
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(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel under this section, the
decision for settlement of claims against the state
judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk
Management Fund coverage applies, lies with
the general counsel for the state judiciary and
the state risk manager.
(4) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee,
after consultation with general counsel for the
Legislature, determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative branch, its members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of
powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Legislative Management Committee
may direct its general counsel to separately represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature
undertakes independent legal representation of
the Legislature, its members, or employees, the
general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney general in writing before
undertaking that representation.
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel under this section, the
decision for settlement of claims against the legislative branch, its members, or employees,
where Risk Management Fund coverage applies,
lies with the general counsel for the Legislature
and the stale risk manager.
(5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
67-5-3 or any other provision of this code, the
attorney general, the general counsel for the
state judiciary, and the general counsel for the
Legislature may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended by their respective offices, including attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing
the state or any indemnified employee against
any claim for which the Risk Management Fund
may be liable and in advising state agencies and
employees regarding any of those claims.
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from
the Risk Management Fund for this purpose.
1990

63-30-36. Defending government employee —
Request — Cooperation — Payment of
judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a
governmental entity shall defend any action brought
against its employee arising from an act or omission
occurring:
(a) during the performance of the employee's
duties;
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend
its employee against a claim, the employee shall
make a written request to the governmental entity to defend him:
(i) within ten days after service of process
upon him; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements imposed on
the entity in connection with insurance carried by the entity relating to the risk involved.

63-30-37
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(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or
fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the
governmental entity need not defend or continue
to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment,
compromise, or settlement against the employee
in respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend,
or subject to any court rule or order, decline to continue to defend, an action against an employee if it
determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not
occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or
(iii) under color of authority;
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the
frau<l or malice of the employee; or
(c) that the injury or damage on which the
claim was based resulted from:
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal
to or greater by weight than the established legal limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely
driving the vehicle; or
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
that rendered the person incapable of
safely driving the vehicle; or
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his job function because of the
u~o of alcohol, because of the nonprescribed
use of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined
influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by Section
58-37-4.
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental
entity shall inform the employee whether or not
it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to
provide ;• defense, the basis for its refusal.
(b) A lcfusal by the entity to provide a defense
is not admissible for any purpose in the action in
which the employee is a defendant.
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim.
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense
of an employee under a reservation of rights under
which the governmental entity reserves the right not
to pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are established.

(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37
affects the obligation of a governmental entity to
provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5.
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend, an action
against its employee under the conditions set
forth in Subsection (3), it shall still provide coverage up to the amount specified in Sections
31A-22-304 and 63-30-29.5.
mi
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63-30-37.

R e c o v e r y of judgment p a i d and defense costs by g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e .
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a
judgment entered against him, or any portion of it,
which the governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30-36, the employee may recover from
the governmental entity the amount of the payment
and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense.
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the
defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts
the defense under an agreement as provided in Subsection 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from
the governmental entity under Subsection (1) if:
(a) the employee establishes that the act or
omission upon which the judgment is based occurred during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of his employment, or under
color of authority, and that he conducted the defense in good faith; and
(b) the governmental entity does not establish
that the injury or damage resulted from:
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee;
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal
to or greater by weight than the established legal limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely
driving the vehicle;
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
that rendered the person incapable of
safely driving the vehicle; or
(iii) the employee being physically or
mentally impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his job function because of
the use of alcohol, because of the
nonprescribed use of a controlled substance
as defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of
the combined use of alcohol and a
nonprescribed controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-4.
19S7
63-30-38.

Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a
claim against the governmental entity or an employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental entity for the payment.
1983
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C H A P T E R 33
DECLARATORY J U D G M E N T S
Section
78-33-1.

Jurisdiction of district courts — Form —
EflVict.
>i
78-33-2.
Rights, statu.*, legal relations under in*
slrunrieiils or statutes may he determined.
70-33-3.
Contracts.
78-33-4.
Suit by fiduciary or representative.
78-33-5.
Court's general powers.
78-33-6.
Discretion to deny declaratory relief,
78-33-7.
Appeals and reviews.
78-33-8.
Supplemental relief.
78-33-9.
Trial of issues of fact.
78-33-10.
Costs.
78-33-11.
Parties.
78-33-12.
Chapter to be liberally construed.
78-33-13.
"Person" defined.
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts — Form
— Effect.
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative in form and
effect; and such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree.
1953
78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under in*
struments or statutes m a y be deter*
mined.
Any person interested under a deed, will or written
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
1953
78-33-3. Contracts.
A contract may be construed either before or afler
there has been a breach thereof.
1953
78-33-4. Suit by fiduciary or representative.
Any person interested as or through an executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary,
creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui
que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the
estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic or insolvent,
may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in
respect thereto:
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees,
legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or,
(2) to diiect the executors, administrators or
trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or,
(3) to determine any question arising in the
administration of the estate or trust, including
questions of construction of wills and other writings.
1953
78-33-5. Court's general p o w e r s .
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and
78-33-4 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the

general powers conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any
proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in
which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncei tainty.
1053
78-33-6. Discretion to deny declaratory relief.
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if tendered or entered, would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
1953
78-33-7. A p p e a l s and reviews.
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and
decrees.
1053
78-33-8. Supplemental relief.
Fuither relief based on a declaratory judgment or
decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper.
The application therefor shall be by petition to a
court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the
application is deemed sufficient, the court shall, on
reasonable no'ice, require any adverse party, whose
rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief
should not be granted forthwith.
1953
78-33-9. Trial of issues of fact.
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the
determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be
tried and determined in the same manner as issues of
fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in
the court in which the proceeding is pending.
1953
78-33-10. Costs.
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may
make such award of costs as may seem equitable and
just.

1953

78-33-11. Parties.
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall
be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves
the validity of a municipal or county ordinance or
franchise such municipality or county shall be made
l party, and shall be entitled to be beard, and if a
statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be
Invalid the attorney general Shall be served with a
copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
1953

78-33-12. Chapter to he liberally construed.
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose
is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.
1953
78-33-13. "Person" defined.
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter,
•hall be construed to mean any person, partnership,
joint stock company, unincorporated association or
lociety, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever.
1953
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Ru!e 14

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

TITLE 111. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT
OF ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS,
AND COMMITTEES.
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how
obtained; intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition.
When judicial review by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order or
decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or officer (hereinafter the term
"agency" shall include agency, board, commission,
committee, n; officer), a petition for review shall be
filed with she clerk of the appellate court within the
time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time preserved, then within 30 days after the date of the
written decision or order. The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend,
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a
writ of certiorari. The petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondent(s) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be
reviewed. In each case, the agency shall be named
respondent. The State of Utah shall be deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so
designated in the petition. If two or more persons are
entitled to petition for review of the same order and
their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint petition for review and may
thereafter proceed as a single petitioner.
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of
filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the
review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate court
such filing fees as are established by law, and also the
fee for docketing the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing and docketing fees are paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for
review shall be served by the petitioner on the named
respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General
of Utah, if the state is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the
clerk of the appellate court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding who
have been r rved.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under this rule shall serve upon
all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties who
participated before the agency, and file with the clerk
of the appellate court a motirn for leave to intervene.
The motion shall contain a <oncise statement of the
interest of the moving part; and the grounds upon
which intervention is sough . A motion for leave to
intervene shall 1M? filed within 40 days of the date on
which the petition for review is filed.
Rule 15. The record on review.
(a) Composition of the record. The order sought
to be reviewed, the findings or report on which it is
based, the pleadings, and evidence before the agency
shall constitute tie record on review in proceedings
to review the order of an agency.
(b) Omissions from or misstatements in the
record. If anything material to any party is omitted
from the ie ord or is misstated, the parties may at
any time supply the omission or correct the misstatement by stipulation, or the appellate court, upon motion or on its own initiative, may at any time direct
that the omission or misstatement be corrected and, if
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necessary, that a supplemental record be prepared
and filed.
Rule 16. Filing of the record.
(a) Agency to file; time for filing; notice of filing. The agency shall file the record with the clerk of
the appellate court within 40 days after service upon
it of the petition for review. The court may shorten or
extend the time above prescribed. The clerk shall
give notice to all parties of the date on which the
record is filed.
(b) Filing; what constitutes. The agency may file
the entire record or such parts as the parties may
designate by stipulation filed with the agency. The
original papers in the agency proceeding or certified
copies may be filed. Instead of filing the record or
designated parts, the agency may file a certified list
of all documents, transcripts of testimony, exhibits
and other material comprising the record, or a list of
such parts as the parties may designate. The filing of
the certified list shall constitute filing of the record.
The parties may stipulate that neither the record nor
a certified list be filed with the court. The stipulation
shall be filed with the clerk and the date of its filing
shall be deemed the date on which the record is filed.
If a certified list is filed, or if the parties designate
only parts of the record for filing or stipulate that
neither the record nor a certified list be filed, the
agency shall retain the record. Upon request of the
court or the request of a party, the record shall be
transmitted to the court notwithstanding any prior
stipulation. All parts of the record retained by the
agency shall be a part of the record on review for all
purposes.
Rule 17. Stay pending review.
Application for a stay of a decision or order of an
agency pending direct review in the appellate court
shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to the
agency if the agency is authorized by law to grant a
stay. If a motion for such relief is made to the appellate court, the motion shall show that application to
the agency for the relief sought is not practicable, or
that application has been made to the agency and
denied, with the reasons given by it for denial. The
motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are
subject to dispute, the motion shall be supported by
affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof.
With the motion shall be filed those parts of the
record relevant to the relief sought. Reasonable notice of the filing of the motion and any hearing shall
be given to all parties to the proceeding in the appellate court. The appellate court may condition relief
under this rule upon the filing of a bond or other
appropriate security. The motion shall be filed with
the clerk and normally will be considered by the
court, but in exceptional cases where such procedure
would be impracticable due to the requirements of
time, the application may be considered by a single
justice or judge of the court.
Rule 18. Applicability of other rules to review.
All provisions of these rules are applicable to review of decisions or orders of agencies, except that
Rules 3 through 8 and 11 through 13 are not applicable. As used in any applicable rule, the term "appellant" includes a petitioner in proceedings to review
agency orders.

